|Das Subjekt als Grenze|
Ein Vergleich der erkenntnistheoretischen Ansätze bei Wittgenstein und Merleau-Ponty
2003, 152 S, Gb, (Gruyter)
Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty have been viewed as the figure heads of the opposing schools of analytical philosophy and phenomenology, respectively. Beginning her topological inquiry from the subject's situatedness in intersubjective space, Kathrin Stengel revisits such central topics in modern philosophy as the question of language and the problem of perception. In juxtaposing Wittgenstein's philosophy of language and Merleau-Ponty's theory of perception, Stengel discloses striking points of intersection and resemblance between the two putatively diverging approaches, with a view to elaborating a comprehensive theory of vision. This book revolutionizes the debate between analytical and continental philosophy.